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Abstract: 
Ethics in the tradition of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons is riddled with sorites-like 
arguments, which lead us by what seem innocent steps to seemingly false conclusions. Take, 
for example, spectrum arguments for the Repugnant Conclusion that appeal to slight 
differences in quality of life. Several authors have taken the view that, since spectrum 
arguments are structurally analogous to sorites arguments, the correct response to spectrum 
arguments is structurally analogous to the correct response to sorites arguments. I argue 
against this sorites analogy. I first consider some potential structural disanalogies between 
spectrum arguments and sorites arguments. But even if these arguments are relevantly 
structurally analogous, they differ in their content in ways that show the sorites analogy to be 
implausible. I explore two content-based disanalogies—one is inspired by Parfit’s work on 
reductionism, and the other involves what I call hypersensitivity. I conclude with a 
methodological lesson. 
 
 
I. The Sorites Analogy 
Ethics in the tradition of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons is riddled with sorites-like 
arguments, which lead us by what seem innocent steps to seemingly false conclusions. One 
such argument goes as follows.2  
                                                          
1 Many thanks to Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh, Ralf Bader, Joe Bowen, David Brink, Tim Campbell, Ruth 
Chang, Matt Clark, Aaron Cotnoir, Roger Crisp, Tom Dougherty, Luke Elson, Johann Frick, Hilary Greaves, 
Katherine Hawley, Joe Horton, Hud Hudson, Tyler John, Kacper Kowalczyk, Andreas Mogensen, Jake Nebel, 
Julia Nefsky, Mike Otsuka, Ketan Ramakrishnan, Kevin Scharp, Larry Temkin, Teru Thomas, Ryan 
Wasserman, and audiences at the University of Oxford, the University of St Andrews, and the Institute for 
Futures Studies in Stockholm, for tremendously helpful comments and discussions. I am extremely fortunate to 
have been mentored by Derek Parfit during the early stages of my career, and will always look back on our 
many hours of correspondence with profound happiness and gratitude. Derek passed away before I could talk 
with him about the main ideas presented in this paper. 
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 Compared with the existence of ten billion people who all have a very high quality of 
life, there is some larger number of people whose existence would be better, even though 
these people all have a slightly lower quality of life. Better yet would be the existence of an 
even larger number of people, at a still lower—though again only slightly lower—quality of 
life. We can continue in this fashion. Assuming that at each step there is a sufficient gain in 
number and a merely slight drop in quality, each step seems one for the better. For some 
fixed precisification of ‘slightly lower quality of life’, there is a finite number of such steps 
that will lead us to a vast number of people, who all have lives that are barely worth living. 
Since each step is one for the better, all of them are. Therefore, compared with the existence 
of ten billion people who all have a very high quality of life, there is some larger number of 
people whose existence would be better, even though these people all have lives that are 
barely worth living. This seemingly false conclusion is what Parfit calls the Repugnant 
Conclusion. 
This argument involves tradeoffs between quality of life and number of people. Not 
everyone believes that the existence of a larger number of people at a positive quality of life 
would be in one way better. Those who do not would reject every step of the above 
argument.3 But other structurally similar arguments involve tradeoffs between different 
evaluatively relevant dimensions, for example, intensity and duration of pain, severity and 
number of harms, pleasure and rational activity, and so on. Most of what I argue here applies 
to all these structurally similar arguments, which we can call spectrum arguments.4   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 See Parfit 1984, 1986, and 2016. 
3 Of course, several of Parfit’s arguments for the Repugnant Conclusion do not presuppose that the existence of 
a larger number of people at a positive quality of life would be in one way better. See Parfit 1984 (chapter 19), 
1986, and 2016.   
4 See, for example: Temkin 1996 and 2012; Norcross 1997; Rachels 1998 and 2004; Carlson 2000; Arrhenius 
and Rabinowicz 2005; Pummer 2017. 
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Spectrum arguments are puzzling. Many of us find that, considered independently, 
their premises seem true and yet their conclusions seem false. Similarly, sorites arguments 
puzzlingly lead us by many small and seemingly innocent steps to seemingly false 
conclusions.5 One goes as follows. 
A collection of ten billion grains of sand is a heap. For any number of grains n, if a 
collection of n grains is a heap, then a collection of n-1 grains is a heap. Since a collection of 
10,000,000,000 grains is a heap, a collection of 9,999,999,999 grains is a heap. Then, since a 
collection of 9,999,999,999 grains is a heap, a collection of 9,999,999,998 grains is a heap. 
Continuing in this fashion, we eventually reach the seemingly false conclusion that a 
collection of one grain is a heap. 
This argument involves the property of being a heap. Other structurally similar 
arguments involve other properties, such as being hirsute, or being rich. In all cases, we begin 
with a finite series of items in which each differs only slightly from the previous along a 
single dimension (number of grains, number of hairs, or number of pennies) relevant to the 
instantiation of the property in question (being a heap, being hirsute, or being rich). Next we 
offer an ‘initiation premise’, that the first item in the series instantiates the property in 
question. We then offer a ‘tolerance premise’, that if any item in the series instantiates the 
property in question, then so does the next item. Finally, we reason as before from these 
premises to the conclusion that the last item in the series instantiates the property in question 
(for example, that a collection of only one grain is a heap, that a head with only one hair on it 
is hirsute, or that a person possessing only a penny is rich). Arguments with this structure are 
sorites arguments. 
Given the respects in which sorites arguments appear structurally similar to spectrum 
arguments, we may suspect that any particular spectrum argument is ‘just another sorites’. 
                                                          
5 See Hyde and Raffman 2018. 
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Several authors accept what I call the sorites analogy, according to which, since spectrum 
arguments are relevantly structurally analogous to sorites arguments, the correct response to 
spectrum arguments is structurally analogous to the correct response to sorites arguments.6 
We may combine the sorites analogy with a particular view of the correct response to sorites 
arguments (for example, that there is a cutoff somewhere along the sorites series, so that a 
collection of n grains is a heap but a collection of n-1 grains is not). Or we may remain silent 
on how to solve the sorites, and claim that whatever the correct response to sorites arguments 
is, the correct response to spectrum arguments is structurally analogous. 
The sorites analogy may inspire hope of resolving important debates in ethics at 
relatively low theoretical cost. For example, if the correct response to the sorites is one in 
which we reject one of its premises whilst explaining away its intuitive appeal, then, 
according to the sorites analogy, the correct response to spectrum arguments would be 
similarly sanguine. So perhaps, contrary to what Parfit and others sometimes suggest, it is not 
the case that, because there are no plausible solutions to the puzzles presented by spectrum 
arguments, the best we can do is to identify which solutions are the least implausible.7  
 In this paper, I argue against the sorites analogy. I first consider some potential 
structural disanalogies between spectrum arguments and sorites arguments (section II). Even 
if none of these provides an adequate response to the sorites analogy, there is another type of 
response. There are content-based disanalogies between spectrum arguments and sorites 
arguments. Even if these arguments are relevantly structurally analogous, they differ in their 
content in ways that show the sorites analogy to be implausible. I explore two content-based 
                                                          
6 See, for example: Griffin 1986 (86-7); Qizilbash 2005; Voorhoeve and Binmore 2006; Knapp 2007; Katz 
2015; Thomas 2016, 2018, and this volume; Handfield and Rabinowicz 2018; Nebel 2018 and this volume; 
Brink 2020; Wasserman ms; and Hare ms. Not all these authors accept the sorites analogy as I have stated it. 
7 See, for instance: Parfit 1984 and 2016; Temkin 2012; Kagan 2015; and Arrhenius ms. 
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disanalogies—one is inspired by Parfit’s work on reductionism (section III), and the other 
involves what I call hypersensitivity (section IV). I conclude with a summary and a broader 
methodological lesson (section V).  
 
II. Structural Disanalogies 
Parfit offers a brief response to the sorites analogy. He writes: 
 
It may be objected that my [spectrum] argument is like what are called Sorites 
Arguments, which are known to lead to false conclusions. Suppose we assume that 
removing any single grain of sand cannot turn a heap of sand into something that is 
not a heap. It can then be argued that, even if we remove every single grain, we must 
still have a heap… If my argument was like this, it could be referred to those who 
work on what is wrong with Sorites Arguments. But my argument is not like this. A 
Sorites Argument appeals to a series of steps, each of which is assumed to make no 
difference. My argument would be like this if it claimed that [B] is not worse than 
[A], [C] is not worse than [B], [D] is not worse than [C], and so on. But the argument 
claims that [B] is better than [A], [C] is better than [B], [D] is better than [C], and so 
on. The objections to Sorites Arguments are therefore irrelevant.8 
 
Parfit is here claiming that there is a structural disanalogy between spectrum arguments and 
sorites arguments. In the sorites argument, each step is claimed to make no difference in that 
if a given collection of grains of sand is a heap, then that collection minus a single grain is 
also a heap. In the spectrum argument for the Repugnant Conclusion, each step—which 
                                                          
8 Parfit 1986 (footnote 12). Also see Rachels 1998 (74). Tenenbaum and Raffman 2012 (footnote 3) suggest a 
similar disanalogy between the sorites and Quinn’s 1990 puzzle of the self-torturer. See Elson 2016 for a reply. 
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involves both a slight drop in the quality of life and a large gain in the number of people who 
exist—is claimed to make a difference in that each population in the series is claimed to be 
better than its immediate predecessor. But the fact that each step of the spectrum argument is 
claimed to make such a difference is not enough to show that it is not relevantly structurally 
analogous to a sorites argument. 
 There are various structural disanalogies between spectrum arguments and sorites 
arguments. The standard sorites argument involves a single dimension (number of grains) 
relevant to whether some item x (collection of grains) is an F (heap). Other arguments that 
appeal to a series of steps involve multiple dimensions (number of grains and distribution of 
grains) relevant to whether x is an F, or to whether x is F-er (heapier) than y. Spectrum 
arguments involve variation along multiple dimensions at each step, and they concern the 
instantiation of relations rather than monadic properties. These disanalogies notwithstanding, 
defenders of the sorites analogy might hold that spectrum arguments are relevantly 
structurally analogous to sorites arguments in that both make essential appeal to slight 
differences (along some dimension) between adjacent items x and x+1 in support of a 
tolerance premise. A tolerance premise can be formulated in terms of monadic properties: if x 
is an F, then x+1 is an F. But it can also be formulated in terms of relations: if x is F-er than 
y, then x+1 is F-er than y. Parfit’s disanalogy, underpinned by the fact that in a spectrum 
argument x+1 is F-er (better) than x, may then be neither here nor there. 
 But these matters are somewhat delicate. The spectrum argument for the Repugnant 
Conclusion does not itself include a tolerance premise according to which if x is better than y, 
then x+1 is better than y. The argument, more precisely, is as follows. 
 
Finite Spectrum: There is a finite series of well-being levels (or levels of quality of 
life) L1, …, Lk such that L1 is a ‘very high’ positive well-being level, Lk is a ‘very 
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low’ positive well-being level, and the difference between any two adjacent levels in 
the series is slight (for some fixed precisification of ‘slight’).9 
 
Tradeoffs: For any positive well-being level Li, and slightly lower positive level Li+1, 
and any number of people n, there is some number of people n+ such that a 
population of n+ people at level Li+1 is better than a population of n people at level Li 
(the difference between Li and Li+1 is given by the fixed precisification of ‘slight’ in 
Finite Spectrum).10 
 
Transitivity: The relation of being better than is transitive. (For any relation R, R is 
transitive if and only if for all x, y, and z, if xRy and yRz, then xRz.) 
 
Therefore 
 
Conclusion: For any positive well-being level Li, and any number of people n, there is 
some number of people n+ such that a population of n+ people at very low positive 
level Lk is better than a population of n people at level Li. So, there is some number of 
people n+ such that a population of n+ people at very low positive level Lk is better 
                                                          
9 Some authors reject this claim (for example see Nebel in this volume, and Thomas 2018, who refers to what I 
call Finite Spectrum as ‘Small Steps’). I believe, but will not show here, that the relevant spectrum arguments 
can replace Finite Spectrum with an analogous claim formulated in terms of slight natural (non-evaluative) 
differences, such as slight differences in pleasure intensity and/or duration. The content-based disanalogies 
between spectrum arguments and sorites arguments developed below in sections III and IV would remain as 
effective against the sorites analogy. 
10 To appreciate the importance of using the same fixed precisification of ‘slight’ here as in Finite Spectrum, see 
Binmore and Voorhoeve 2003. 
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than a population of ten billion people at very high positive level L1. This is the 
Repugnant Conclusion. 
 
We might thus claim that the fact that sorites arguments include a tolerance premise, whereas 
spectrum arguments do not, marks a crucial structural disanalogy between them.11 But this 
may not constitute an adequate response to the sorites analogy. If we accept all the premises 
of the spectrum argument for the Repugnant Conclusion—Finite Spectrum, Tradeoffs, and 
Transitivity—then it is absurd not also to accept all the premises of the following 
‘transitivityless’ spectrum argument. 
 
Finite Spectrum: There is a finite series of well-being levels (or levels of quality of 
life) L1, …, Lk such that L1 is a ‘very high’ positive well-being level, Lk is a ‘very 
low’ positive well-being level, and the difference between any two adjacent levels in 
the series is slight (for some fixed precisification of ‘slight’). 
 
Initiation: There is some number of people n such that n people at very high positive 
level L1 is better than X, a population of ten billion people at very high positive level 
L1. 
 
Tolerance: For any positive well-being level Li, and slightly lower positive level Li+1, 
and any number of people n, if a population of n people at level Li is better than 
population X, then there is some number of people n+ such that a population of n+ 
people at level Li+1 is better than population X (the difference between Li and Li+1 is 
given by the fixed precisification of ‘slight’ in Finite Spectrum). 
                                                          
11 See Temkin 1996 (section 5) and 2012 (chapter 9). 
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Therefore 
 
Conclusion: There is some number of people n such that a population of n people at 
very low positive level Lk is better than X, a population of ten billion people at very 
high positive level L1. This, again, is the Repugnant Conclusion. 
 
Finite Spectrum is the same premise in both arguments. It is absurd to accept Tradeoffs but 
not Initiation. And Tradeoffs and Transitivity together entail Tolerance. According to 
Tradeoffs, for any positive well-being level Li, and slightly lower positive level Li+1, and any 
number of people n, there is some number of people n+ such that a population of n+ people at 
level Li+1 is better than a population of n people at level Li. So, according to Transitivity, (for 
any positive well-being level Li, and slightly lower positive level Li+1, and any number of 
people n) if a population of n people at level Li is better than population X, then a population 
of n+ people at level Li+1 is better than population X. This is Tolerance. 
 Defenders of the sorites analogy might then hold that, since the transitivityless 
spectrum argument is relevantly structurally analogous to a sorites argument in that both 
make essential appeal to a tolerance premise, if the correct response to a sorites argument is 
to reject its tolerance premise, then the correct response to the transitivityless spectrum 
argument is to reject Tolerance. This would in turn entail that the correct response to the 
original spectrum argument is to reject the conjunction of Tradeoffs and Transitivity. To 
those of us who cannot part with Transitivity, this would mean the correct response to the 
original spectrum argument is to reject Tradeoffs.12    
                                                          
12 Even setting aside any allegiance to Transitivity, it might seem plausible that if we ought to reject Tolerance, 
then we ought to reject Tradeoffs too. See Pummer 2018.   
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 We might appeal to a different structural disanalogy. According to a standard sorites 
argument, a collection of ten billion grains of sand is a heap, and, since for any number of 
grains n, if a collection of n grains is a heap, a collection of n-1 grains is a heap, it follows 
that one grain is a heap. We begin with an item that is intuitively a heap and end up with an 
item that is intuitively not a heap. We are also making things intuitively less heapy at each 
step (or at least at some of the steps). Viewed purely from the relational perspective of being 
more or less heapy, then, there is no puzzle. Viewing things from the relational perspective of 
being better or worse clearly does nothing to take the puzzle out of spectrum arguments, as 
they come prepackaged in such relational terms—the first item is intuitively better than the 
last one even though each step is intuitively one for the better. 
But even if this marks a crucial structural disanalogy between standard sorites 
arguments and spectrum arguments, there remain the multidimensional sorites arguments 
alluded to earlier. One such multidimensional sorites argument goes as follows. 
 
Finite Spectrum*: There is a finite series of sand distribution patterns D1, …, Dk such 
that D1 is a perfectly heapy cone-shaped distribution, Dk is a perfectly flat and thin 
distribution, and the difference in flatness between any two adjacent distributions in 
the series is slight (for some fixed precisification of ‘slight’). 
 
Initiation*: There is some number of grains n such that n grains with distribution D1 is 
heapier than X, a collection of ten billion grains with perfectly heapy cone-shaped 
distribution D1. 
 
Tolerance*: For any sand distribution pattern Di, and slightly flatter distribution Di+1, 
and any number of grains n, if a collection of n grains with distribution Di is heapier 
11 
 
than collection X, then there is some number of grains n+ such that a collection of n+ 
grains with distribution Di+1 is heapier than collection X (the difference between Di 
and Di+1 is given by the fixed precisification of ‘slight’ in Finite Spectrum*). 
 
Therefore 
 
Conclusion*: There is some number of grains n such that a collection of n grains with 
perfectly flat and thin distribution Dk is heapier than X, a collection of ten billion 
grains with perfectly heapy cone-shaped distribution D1.  
 
Truth be told, I am not sure Tolerance* is very compelling (it strikes me as far less intuitive 
than Tolerance or Tradeoffs). But, assuming that Tolerance* is compelling, we restore the 
analogy with the spectrum argument. That is, taking up the relational perspective of being 
more or less heapy fails to remove the puzzle, as the first item is intuitively heapier than the 
last one even if each step is intuitively one for the heapier.13 
                                                          
13 There is a further potential structural disanalogy. In the multidimensional sorites argument, we begin with an 
item that is intuitively a heap, take a number of steps each claimed to be for the heapier, and end up with an item 
that is intuitively not a heap. In the spectrum argument, we begin with an item that is intuitively good, take a 
number of steps each claimed to be for the better, and end up with an item that is still intuitively good (at least, 
assuming the quality of life of those in the last population is not too low). But this difference seems an artifact of 
the particular examples chosen. It is plausible that, in some spectrum arguments, we begin with an item that is 
intuitively good, take a number of steps each claimed to be for the better, and end up with an item that is 
intuitively bad (see Nebel 2018). And it is plausible that, in some multidimensional sorites arguments, we begin 
with an item that is intuitively a heap, take a number of steps each claimed to be for the heapier, and end up with 
an item that is still intuitively a heap (though intuitively less heapy than the first item). For two recent relevant 
discussions of comparatives and vagueness, see: Constantinescu 2016 and Silk 2019. 
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 In this section, I considered some potential structural disanalogies between spectrum 
arguments and sorites arguments. Even if there is a crucial structural disanalogy between 
standard (one-dimensional) sorites arguments and spectrum arguments, arguably spectrum 
arguments are relevantly structurally analogous to multidimensional sorites arguments. 
Moreover, even though the original spectrum argument does not itself contain a tolerance 
premise, the transitivityless spectrum argument does. Defenders of the sorites analogy might 
argue that, if the correct response to a sorites argument is to reject its tolerance premise, then 
the correct response to the transitivityless spectrum argument is to reject Tolerance, and thus 
the correct response to the original spectrum argument is to reject the conjunction of 
Tradeoffs and Transitivity.  
 
III. Indeterminacy 
In this section I highlight a relatively sanguine response available for many sorites arguments 
that is unavailable for spectrum arguments. As this disanalogy holds even if sorites arguments 
and spectrum arguments are relevantly structurally analogous, it is a content-based 
disanalogy. This disanalogy draws inspiration from Parfit’s work on reductionism, and the 
response to sorites arguments it suggests.  
 Parfit famously defends what he calls reductionism about personal identity, according 
to which the fact that person X at time t1 is one and the same person as person Y at time t2 
just consists in the fact that X stands in some other, ‘impersonal’ relation or relations to Y, 
such as that X is sufficiently psychologically or physically connected to or continuous with 
Y.14 This view is controversial. But it is relatively uncontroversial that the fact that country X 
at time t1 is one and the same country as country Y at time t2 just consists in the fact that X 
stands in some other relation to Y, involving membership, territory, culture, or government. It 
                                                          
14 Parfit 1984 (210-11). 
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is also relatively uncontroversial that the fact that country X at time t is a country just consists 
in the fact that X has some other property or properties, involving membership, territory, 
culture, or government. Most of us are, in Parfit’s sense of the term, reductionists both about 
being a country and about being one and the same country. 
 The following soritical story illustrates one way in which Parfitian reductionism about 
personal identity is controversial: 
 
Derek walks into an operating room at 9:12am, and a person Y walks out at 9:13am. 
During this minute, a scientist can slide her finger in a way that rapidly flips any 
number of one hundred (or one billion…) different switches. Each additional switch 
she flips would further slightly decrease the degree to which the relevant 
psychological and physical relations hold between Derek and Y. In the case in which 
one switch is flipped, Derek is one and the same person as Y. In the case in which all 
hundred (or billion…) switches are flipped, Derek is not one and the same person as 
Y—instead, Y is Greta.15 
 
What happens in the cases in between? According to reductionism about personal identity, 
Derek and Y are one and the same person only if the relevant psychological or physical 
relations hold between Derek and Y to a sufficient degree. If we cannot say precisely what 
counts as sufficient, the view implies there is some n such that there is not a ‘Yes or No’ 
answer to the question ‘Is Derek one and the same person as Y if n switches are flipped?’.16 
But according to Parfitian reductionists this would not present a deep puzzle. On their view, 
when n switches are flipped, there is in reality only one possible outcome: the relevant 
                                                          
15 This is a retelling of the Combined Spectrum, found in Parfit 1984 (section 86).  
16 See Parfit 1984 (206) on the antecedent of this conditional. 
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psychological and physical relations hold between Derek and Y to the precise degree that 
corresponds to n switches being flipped. Thus, ‘Derek is Y’ and ‘Derek is not Y’ are merely 
two ways of describing a single outcome. Alternatively, if we were ‘tidy-minded’ 
reductionists and precisified ‘sufficient degree’ in some arbitrary way, we would then find it 
relatively unpuzzling that there is some n for which Derek and Y are one and the same 
person, though for n+1 Derek and Y are not one and the same person (that is, we would find 
it relatively unproblematic to reject the relevant tolerance premise).17 Of course, many of us 
find both of these alternatives puzzling, even absurd. We could then view the choice between 
it being indeterminate what degree is sufficient and it being determinate what degree is 
sufficient as a fatal dilemma for Parfitian reductionism. 
 A lesson for sorites arguments is that, when it is true that whether x is an F relevantly 
just consists in whether x has gradable property P to a sufficient degree, it can be 
indeterminate whether x is an F, but in a relatively unpuzzling way.18 For instance, it is 
plausible that, when other things (like the sand distribution pattern) are equal, whether a 
collection of grains of sand is a heap can just consist in whether this collection has a 
sufficient number of grains. Clearly ten billion is a sufficient number of grains, and one is 
not. For some number n, it is plausible that there is not a ‘Yes or No’ answer to the question, 
‘Is a collection of n grains of sand a heap?’. But we would not be deeply puzzled by our 
inability to say whether a collection of n grains of sand is a heap. ‘Heap’ and ‘Not Heap’ are 
                                                          
17 Parfit 1984 (241) writes, ‘By drawing our line, we have chosen to give an answer to this question. But, since 
our choice was arbitrary, it cannot justify any claim about what matters. If this is how we answer the question 
about my identity, we have made it true that, in this range of cases, personal identity is not what matters.’ Also 
see Sider 2002 (63) on artificially sharpened boundaries. 
18 By ‘relevantly just consists in’, I intend to highlight the specific meaning that Parfit gives to the words ‘just 
consists in’. As he notes in Parfit 1995 (33), his brand of constitutive reductionism is ‘partly conceptual’. Also 
see Parfit 1999. 
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merely two ways of describing a single outcome. Correlatively, if we precisified ‘sufficient 
number’ in some arbitrary way, it would then be relatively unpuzzling that there is some 
number n such that n grains make a heap but n-1 do not (that is, we would find it relatively 
unproblematic to reject the relevant tolerance premise). 
 I am sympathetic to Parfit’s view that this relatively sanguine response is available for 
many sorites arguments.19 In addition to the case of being a heap, it also seems available in 
the case of being hirsute, and in the case of being rich. When other things (like the hair 
distribution pattern) are equal, whether a head is hirsute can just consist in whether this head 
has a sufficient number of hairs. And, when other things are equal, whether one is rich can 
just consist in whether one has a sufficient number of pennies. There will be points along the 
relevant sorites series at which we cannot say whether an item has the property of being 
hirsute, or the property of being rich (there is not a ‘Yes or No’ answer to these questions). 
But we will not be deeply puzzled by our inability to say. Again, what we will have are 
merely different ways of describing a single outcome. 
 But as the case of being one and the same person suggests, the sanguine response may 
not be available for all sorites arguments.20 For another example, consider the property of 
being conscious in the sense of there being something it is like to be an individual at a given 
time. It seems that, for any putative sorites series in which an individual is conscious at the 
beginning and non-conscious at the end, there will nonetheless be a ‘Yes or No’ answer to the 
                                                          
19 The word ‘relatively’ is important. I do not intend to claim that Parfit’s response resolves all that is puzzling 
about the sorites arguments to which it applies. It may remain an independently implausible solution, even if it 
is the least implausible solution of those available.  
20 Parfit 1984 (232) writes: ‘When it is applied to other subjects, such as phenomenal colour, the Sorites 
Argument cannot be so easily dismissed. Nor does this dismissal seem plausible when the argument is applied to 
personal identity. Most of us believe that our own continued existence is, in several ways, unlike the continued 
existence of a heap of sand.’ Also see Alter and Rachels 2004. 
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question ‘Is this individual conscious?’ at each step along the way. Suppose, for example, 
that this individual is very gradually anesthetized. It may be hard to say where the individual 
goes from being conscious to being non-conscious, but intuitively there is at each step either 
something it is like to be this individual, or there is not.21 Here we do not have a single 
outcome, and two ways of describing it. We have two different possible outcomes. Similar 
remarks may be true of sorites series concerning when collections of objects compose further 
objects.22  
 It would appear, then, that even if sorites arguments involving being a heap, being 
hirsute, being rich, being a person, being one and the same person, being conscious, and 
being a composite object, are all relevantly structurally analogous, there is a content-based 
disanalogy between them. Whereas it seems the relatively sanguine Parfitian response is 
available in the cases of being a heap, being hirsute, and being rich, it is significantly more 
controversial that such a response is available in the case of being a person, being one and the 
same person, being conscious, and being a composite object. This is already enough to cast 
doubt on the underlying logic of the sorites analogy, that if two arguments are relevantly 
structurally analogous, the correct response to one is structurally analogous to the correct 
response to the other. 
 Just as there can be content-based disanalogies between structurally analogous one-
dimensional sorites arguments, so too can there be such disanalogies between structurally 
analogous multidimensional sorites arguments. Earlier I presented a multidimensional sorites 
argument concerning the relation of being heapier than. I noted that a defender of the sorites 
                                                          
21 See, for example: Unger 1988; Antony 2006; and Simon 2017. 
22 See, for example: Sider 2001; Barnes 2007; and Korman 2010. Sider 2001 (125) and others argue that the 
argument from vagueness for universalism about composition is not ‘just another sorites’, even though it has the 
structure of a sorites argument. That is, they hold that there is a content-based disanalogy between Sider’s 
sorites argument and the more familiar ones involving being a heap or being hirsute. 
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analogy might argue that, if the correct response to this multidimensional sorites argument is 
to reject Tolerance*, then the correct response to the transitivityless spectrum argument is to 
reject Tolerance (and thus the correct response to the original spectrum argument is to reject 
the conjunction of Tradeoffs and Transitivity). Even if these arguments are relevantly 
structurally analogous, the relatively sanguine Parfitian response is available in the case of 
the multidimensional sorites argument but not in the case of the transitivityless spectrum 
argument. Or so I argue. 
Recall that the sorites series of the multidimensional sorites argument begins with X, 
a collection of ten billion grains with perfectly heapy cone-shaped distribution D1, and ends 
with a collection of a (much) larger number of grains with perfectly flat and thin distribution 
Dk. At each step along the series, the distribution of grains gets slightly flatter (and some 
arbitrarily large number of grains gets added). At each step, we ask, ‘Is there some number of 
grains n with sand distribution pattern Di such that this collection is heapier than collection 
X?’. For the step featuring distribution D2, it seems the answer is Yes. For the step featuring 
distribution Dk, it seems the answer is No.  
For the answer to be Yes, the difference between Di and D1 must be sufficiently small. 
Crucially, it is also plausible that when other things are equal, whether there is a number of 
grains n such that n grains with distribution Di that is heapier than collection X can relevantly 
just consist in whether the difference between Di and D1 is sufficiently small. For some step 
featuring Di, it is plausible that there is not a ‘Yes or No’ answer to our question. But we 
would not be deeply puzzled by this indeterminacy. ‘Heapier than X’ and ‘Not Heapier than 
X’ are merely two ways of describing a single outcome. Correlatively, if we precisified 
‘sufficiently small’ in some arbitrary way, it would then be relatively unpuzzling that there is 
a number of grains n such that n grains with distribution Di is heapier than collection X, but 
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no number of grains with slightly flatter distribution Di+1 that is heapier than collection X 
(that is, we would find it relatively unproblematic to reject Tolerance*). 
Next recall that the sorites series of the transitivityless spectrum argument begins with 
X, a population of ten billion people at very high positive level L1, and ends with a 
population of a (much) larger number of people at very low positive level Lk. At each step 
along the series, the quality of life drops slightly (and some arbitrarily large number of people 
gets added). At each step, we ask, ‘Is there some number of people n at well-being level Li 
such that this population is better than population X?’. For the step featuring well-being level 
L2, it seems the answer is Yes. For the step featuring well-being level Lk, it seems the answer 
is No. 
For the answer to be Yes, the difference between Li and L1 must be sufficiently small. 
Crucially, it is also plausible that, whether there is a number of people n such that n people at 
well-being level Li is better than population X cannot just consist in whether the difference 
between Li and L1 is sufficiently small.23 For each step featuring Li, it is plausible that there is 
a ‘Yes or No’ answer to our question. ‘Better than X’ and ‘Not Better than X’ are not merely 
two ways of describing a single outcome. Instead, what we have here are two different 
possible ways for things to be (‘Not Better than X’ covers a range of more specific 
possibilities, such as ‘Worse than X’, ‘As Good as X’, ‘On a Par with X’, ‘Imprecisely as 
Good as X’, or ‘Incomparable with X’).24 Correlatively, if we precisified ‘sufficiently small’ 
in some arbitrary way, it would remain puzzling that there is a number of people n such that n 
                                                          
23 Note that this claim does not imply that such evaluative properties are irreducible to any other properties. 
Some hold that, while certain evaluative properties are reducible to other evaluative properties, evaluative 
properties are irreducible to non-evaluative properties. This is Parfit’s view (see Parfit 2011, chapters 25 through 
27). Others, such as naturalists, hold that evaluative properties are reducible to non-evaluative properties.  
24 Several of these ‘more specific possibilities’ I have parenthetically listed here are discussed by others in this 
volume, including Nebel, Arrhenius, Chang, Rabinowicz, and Thomas. 
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people at well-being level Li is better than population X, but no number of people at slightly 
lower well-being level Li+1 that is better than population X (that is, we would continue to find 
it difficult to reject Tolerance). 
It is important to recognize that the content-based disanalogy I have just drawn 
between the multidimensional sorites argument and the transitivityless spectrum argument is 
not that we can appeal to indeterminacy in response to the former only. It is that, while 
sometimes there is no ‘Yes or No’ answer to the question ‘Is there some number of grains n 
with sand distribution pattern Di such that this collection is heapier than collection X?’, there 
is always a ‘Yes or No’ answer to the question, ‘Is there some number of people n at well-
being level Li such that this population is better than population X?’. It is compatible with the 
claim that there is a ‘Yes or No’ answer to a question that it is indeterminate whether the 
answer is Yes or is instead No (it can be determinate that [either there will be a sea battle 
tomorrow, or there will not] even if it is indeterminate whether [there will be a sea battle 
tomorrow]). Yes and No correspond to two different possible ways for things to be, even if it 
is unsettled which way things actually are.25 When there is no ‘Yes or No’ answer to the 
question ‘Is there some number of grains n with sand distribution pattern Di such that this 
collection is heapier than collection X?’, this is because, while there is only one way for 
things to be, there are different (equally good) ways to describe it. This sort of indeterminacy 
is far less puzzling.26 
                                                          
25 For discussion of this sort of metaphysical indeterminacy, see: Williams 2008; Barnes and Cameron 2009; 
Barnes and Williams 2010 and 2011; and Eklund 2011. 
26 According to a further content-based disanalogy, the conclusions of sorites arguments are more implausible 
than the conclusions of structurally analogous spectrum arguments. For instance, we might argue that accepting 
the claim that a very flat collection of sand with enough grains is heapier than a paradigmatically very heapy 
collection of sand involves a conceptual mistake, whereas accepting the Repugnant Conclusion does not. For 
discussion of this kind of content-based disanalogy, see Campbell ms.  
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IV. Hypersensitivity  
Recall that defenders of the sorites analogy might hold that, since the transitivityless 
spectrum argument is relevantly structurally analogous to a sorites argument in that both 
make essential appeal to a tolerance premise, if the correct response to a sorites argument is 
to reject its tolerance premise, then the correct response to the transitivityless spectrum 
argument is to reject Tolerance. This would in turn entail that the correct response to the 
original spectrum argument is to reject the conjunction of Tradeoffs and Transitivity. To 
those of us who cannot part with Transitivity, this would mean the correct response to the 
original spectrum argument is to reject Tradeoffs.  
In this section, I respond to this variant of the sorites analogy by offering another 
content-based disanalogy between sorites arguments and spectrum arguments. In particular, I 
argue that, while rejecting Tradeoffs of the spectrum argument yields what I call 
hypersensitivity, rejecting the structurally analogous premise of a structurally analogous 
multidimensional sorites argument does not.  
 I will say there is hypersensitivity when a slight difference in one sort of property 
makes a radical difference in another sort of property.27 Equivalently, A-properties are 
hypersensitive to B-properties when a slight difference in B-properties makes a radical 
difference in A-properties. I assume for now that we have a decent enough intuitive grasp of 
‘slight’ and ‘radical’ to understand what hypersensitivity is, but at the end of this section I 
offer a more precise definition of hypersensitivity, which does not appeal to the notions of 
‘slight’ or ‘radical’ differences. One intuitive example would be deserving hell rather than 
heaven merely in virtue of uttering one additional mild obscenity.28 Here a slight difference 
                                                          
27 I explore hypersensitivity and its significance for ethics in Pummer ms. 
28 Sider 2002. 
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in one’s conduct makes a radical difference to what one deserves. Another example of 
hypersensitivity would be that one life is radically better than an otherwise exactly similar 
life, merely in virtue of containing one fewer stubbed toe.29 Such hypersensitivity is deeply 
puzzling, and views that entail that it exists bear a significant theoretical cost. 
 The hypersensitivity of A-properties to B-properties entails the existence of a cutoff 
somewhere along a relatively smooth spectrum of B-properties. But it is not the existence of a 
cutoff per se that makes hypersensitivity so puzzling. There are plenty of cutoffs and 
threshold phenomena that have nothing to do with hypersensitivity.  
Some properties come with built in cutoffs. Consider the property of having at least 
100 grains. Clearly, a collection of 99 grains does not have this property. There is no 
hypersensitivity here, as the difference between having this property and not can just consist 
in the slight difference of one grain. Next consider three lines on a Euclidean plane. Lines q 
and r are parallel, and line s is perpendicular to them. If the interior angle formed between q 
and s were not 90-degrees, but 89-degrees, q and r would no longer be parallel. That is, q and 
r would eventually intersect. Does the slight difference of a single degree make the large 
difference of q and r intersecting rather than running parallel? In some sense it does. But this 
is not the sort of difference-making involved in hypersensitivity. This is not a case of one 
difference that makes some further difference. Whether q and r are parallel just consists in 
whether q and r form 90-degree angles with s. If the difference between q and r intersecting 
rather than running parallel is large, so too is the difference between q forming a 90-degree 
angle with s rather than q forming an 89-degree angle with s. 
Other properties are such that we can build cutoffs into them. For instance, the law 
often draws cutoffs in somewhat arbitrary ways, to avoid issues with borderline cases.30 In 
                                                          
29 Pummer 2017. 
30 See Glover’s 1977 (166) discussion of speed limits. 
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some countries, only those who are at least 18 years old are legally permitted to vote. 
Someone a day younger does not have this legal property. It may thus seem that a slight 
difference in one’s age makes a large difference in the legal properties one has. But a slight 
difference in age is not enough. What makes the large difference in one’s legal properties is 
the non-slight difference between [being under 18 and it being the law that those who are 
under 18 cannot vote] and [being at least 18 and it being the law that those who are at least 18 
can vote].31 
 Some cutoffs involve slight differences in B-properties that make big differences in 
A-properties by causally triggering other, larger differences in B-properties. Take the case of 
placing a feather on one side of a perfectly balanced scale, which then knocks over the first in 
a series of dominos, or flips on a Rube Goldberg machine. Or the case of releasing a drop of 
water at the top of a snowy hill. Or the butterfly effect. Slight differences in B-properties can 
cause countless other differences in B-properties, often progressively larger ones, and often 
very rapidly (at the subatomic level very complex causal sequences can unfold seemingly 
instantaneously).32 There is no hypersensitivity here. In each of these examples, we do not 
have a slight difference in B-properties that is itself making a large difference in A-properties. 
Instead, we have a slight difference in B-properties that is causing other differences in B-
properties which are together making a large difference in A-properties.  
                                                          
31 Similar remarks apply to the creation of cutoffs with desires and promises. Suppose I desire at least 100 grains 
of sand. It may seem that the slight difference of a single grain could then make a large difference in desire 
satisfaction. But a slight difference in grains is not enough. What makes the large difference in desire 
satisfaction is the non-slight difference between [having 99 grains and not desiring them] and [having 100 
grains and desiring them]. 
32 Other examples include Sorensen 1988 (251-2) on the drop of rocket fuel needed to achieve escape velocity 
and Chang 2002 (136-7) on the straw that broke the camel’s back. 
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 Consider a further illustration of this last distinction. Suppose that, were I to carefully 
remove a single topmost brick from a brick building, this would leave all the other bricks 
unperturbed. However, were I to remove a middle brick, this would cause adjacent bricks to 
wobble, leading the whole building to shake and topple over. The removal of a brick is itself 
a slight difference in B-properties, but if it is a middle brick, its removal triggers many other 
differences in B-properties, which together make a large difference to the A-property of being 
a building. It is more puzzling that I could make a large difference to the A-property of being 
a building merely by removing a single topmost brick.  
 The case of repeatedly removing topmost brick after topmost brick is another version 
of the original sorites case.33 Suppose that in response to the sorites argument we reject its 
tolerance premise, and draw a cutoff for being a heap (or building) at some precise number of 
grains (or bricks). Suppose reductionism about being a heap is correct, so that when other 
things (like the sand distribution pattern) are equal, whether a collection of grains of sand is a 
heap can just consist in whether this collection has a sufficient number of grains. Then the 
difference between being a heap and not can be slight. But suppose instead that whether a 
collection of grains of sand is a heap does not just consist in whether this collection has a 
sufficient number of grains—that is, suppose that the former difference is some further 
difference, distinct from the latter one. This would at least pave the way for the view that the 
cutoff between being a heap and not being a heap entails the existence of hypersensitivity. 
But it is not clear that the slight difference in grain-properties would here be making a radical 
difference in heap-properties. Arguably the difference in heapiness between a collection of n 
grains that is not a heap and a collection of n+1 grains that is a heap is much less than the 
difference in heapiness between a collection of just one grain and a collection of 
                                                          
33 In the case of heaps of sand, the relevant structure is not as differentially affected by taking individual grains 
from the middle rather than from the top. 
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n+10,000,000,000 grains. (At any rate, I say more below about how we could precisify 
‘radical’.)  
Before returning to spectrum arguments, we need to observe a further point about 
what hypersensitivity can consist in. Large differences in properties include large differences 
in relations as well as in monadic properties. An item x can be somewhat A-er than another 
item y, or it can be much A-er than y. Hypersensitivity can accordingly be formulated in 
terms of relations: it occurs when a slight difference in B-properties between items x and y 
makes it the case that, while x is radically A-er than z, y is not A-er than z.  
Now recall the spectrum argument for the Repugnant Conclusion, which involves 
tradeoffs between quality of life and number of people. The rejection of Tradeoffs in this 
argument entails that there is hypersensitivity, if the following two claims hold: (1) for any 
positive well-being level Li, and slightly lower positive level Li+1, and any number of people 
n, the difference between a population of n people at level Li and a population of n people at 
level Li+1 is slight; (2) a radically larger number of people at the same positive quality of life 
is radically better. It is controversial that either (1) or (2) holds. Below I consider an objection 
to (1). Parfit defends (2) by arguing that, unless we accept it, we face what he calls the 
Absurd Conclusion.34 Not everyone is convinced. Not everyone believes that the existence of 
a larger number of people at the same positive quality of life would be better, let alone that 
the existence of a radically larger number of such people would be radically better. Those 
who doubt (2) might wish to instead consider the ‘negative’ analog of the spectrum argument, 
the conclusion of which is the Negative Repugnant Conclusion (that there is some number of 
people n, such that n people at a barely negative well-being level is worse than ten billion 
                                                          
34 Parfit 1984 (chapter 18). Also see Parfit 2016 (112). 
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people at a vastly lower level).35 It seems hard to deny that the existence of a radically larger 
number of people at the same negative quality of life would be radically worse. For 
simplicity, I assume that (2) holds.  
Given (1) and (2), the rejection of Tradeoffs entails that there is hypersensitivity. If 
we reject Tradeoffs, we claim that there is some well-being level Li and some number of 
people n, such that there is no number of people at slightly lower level Li+1 that is better than 
n people at level Li. From (2), if n+ is radically larger than n, then n+ people at level Li 
[population X] is radically better than n people at level Li [population Z]. From the rejection 
of Tradeoffs, n+ people at level Li+1 [population Y] is not better than n people at level Li 
[population Z]. From (1), the difference between n+ people at level Li [population X] and n+ 
people at level Li+1 [population Y] is slight. Thus, we have a slight difference in B-properties 
(well-being levels) between population X and population Y that makes it the case that, while 
population X is radically A-er (better) than population Z, population Y is not A-er (better) 
than population Z. This is hypersensitivity. 
While rejecting Tradeoffs of the spectrum argument yields hypersensitivity, rejecting 
the structurally analogous premise of a structurally analogous multidimensional sorites 
argument does not. I call the latter the ‘toleranceless’ sorites argument. It goes as follows.36 
 
Finite Spectrum*: There is a finite series of sand distribution patterns D1, …, Dk such 
that D1 is a perfectly heapy cone-shaped distribution, Dk is a perfectly flat and thin 
distribution, and the difference in flatness between any two adjacent distributions in 
the series is slight (for some fixed precisification of ‘slight’). 
                                                          
35 See Broome 2004 (213). Mulgan 2002 and others refer to this conclusion as the ‘Reverse Repugnant 
Conclusion’. 
36 From Wasserman ms and Temkin 2012 (chapter 9). 
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Tradeoffs*: For any sand distribution pattern Di, and slightly flatter distribution Di+1, 
and any number of grains n, there is some number of grains n+ such that a collection 
of n+ grains with distribution Di+1 is heapier than a collection of n grains with 
distribution Di (the difference between Di and Di+1 is given by the fixed precisification 
of ‘slight’ in Finite Spectrum*). 
 
Transitivity*: The relation of being heapier than is transitive.  
 
Therefore 
 
Conclusion*: There is some number of grains n such that a collection of n grains with 
perfectly flat and thin distribution Dk is heapier than X, a collection of ten billion 
grains with perfectly heapy cone-shaped distribution D1.  
 
It is not plausible that rejecting Tradeoffs* yields hypersensitivity. The analog of claim (2) is 
claim (2*): a radically larger number of grains with the same sand distribution pattern is 
radically heapier. While (2) is controversial, it is defensible. But (2*) is very implausible. 
First, if we have a perfectly cone-shaped distribution D1, it is plausible enough that a 
radically larger number of grains with distribution D1 is heapier, but it is not clear that it is 
radically heapier. Second, (2*) seems even less plausible for flatter distributions. When 
considering nearly flat distributions, (2*) seems absurd. Relative to such distributions, 
radically more grains may not even make things heapier at all. If we reject Tradeoffs*, we 
claim that there is some sand distribution pattern Di and some number of grains n, such that 
there is no number of grains with slightly flatter distribution Di+1 that is heapier than n grains 
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with distribution Di. But if n+ grains with Di is not significantly heapier than n grains with 
Di—let alone radically so—we do not get hypersensitivity of the form in question (in which a 
slight difference in B-properties between items x and y makes it the case that, while x is 
radically A-er than item z, y is not A-er than z). So, there is a content-based disanalogy 
between the spectrum argument and the toleranceless sorites argument.37  
 Let us now consider three objections to the above argument for this content-based 
disanalogy. The first objection is that the derivation of hypersensitivity from the rejection of 
Tradeoffs assumes that, if we reject Tradeoffs, we claim that there is some determinate well-
being level Li, and some number of people n, such that there is no number of people at 
slightly lower level Li+1 that is better than n people at level Li. But this assumption is 
unwarranted. We can instead reject Tradeoffs by claiming that it is indeterminate which well-
being level Li is such that for some number of people n there is no number of people at 
slightly lower level Li+1 that is better than n people at level Li.  
 Response to the first objection: The derivation of hypersensitivity from the rejection 
of Tradeoffs does not make the assumption in question. I do assume that there is always a 
‘Yes or No’ answer to the question, ‘For each well-being level Li and each number n, is there 
some number of people n+ such that n+ people at slightly lower level Li+1 is better than n 
people at level Li?’ And hypersensitivity can be derived if for some level Li the answer is No, 
even if it is indeterminate which particular Li this is. Incorporating such indeterminacy does 
not block the derivation of hypersensitivity, though it can make it indeterminate where the 
hypersensitivity is located. And while incorporating such indeterminacy about the location of 
                                                          
37 I take it this disanalogy is not restricted to the subject matter of grains and heaps of sand. For example, it is 
also implausible that for any hair distribution pattern Di, a radically larger number of hairs with distribution Di is 
radically more hirsute. Rejecting the analog of Tradeoffs* in such relevantly analogous toleranceless sorites 
arguments would not yield hypersensitivity.  
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hypersensitivity can remove the arbitrariness of hypersensitivity being determinately located 
at one well-being level rather than another, it does nothing to mitigate the implausibility of 
hypersensitivity itself. Take a comparison with supervenience failures. The A-properties are 
said to supervene on the B-properties when there cannot be a difference in A-properties 
unless there is a difference in B-properties.38 Many hold, for instance, that mental properties 
supervene on physical properties, and that evaluative properties supervene on natural 
properties. Suppose we have 100 possible worlds that are exactly similar with respect to their 
natural properties. If 99 of them are very good, and one of them is not good at all, we have 
one kind of supervenience failure. Claiming that it is indeterminate which of these worlds is 
not good allows us to avoid the arbitrariness of the supervenience failure being determinately 
located at one of these worlds rather than another, but it does nothing to mitigate the 
implausibility of the supervenience failure itself. 
The second objection is an objection to claim (1). (According to claim (1), for any 
well-being level Li, and slightly lower level Li+1, and any number of people n, the difference 
between a population of n people at level Li and a population of n people at level Li+1 is 
slight.) The objection is that the sum of many individually slight differences might not itself 
be a slight difference. As Parfit writes, ‘The greatest mass of milk might be found in a heap 
of bottles each containing only a single drop’.39 Even if the mass of each drop tended to zero, 
we could arguably retain the same great total mass of milk with a supply of bottles that 
tended to infinity.40  
                                                          
38 Hypersensitivity does not yield supervenience failure. However, it does yield a failure of what Kim 1987 
(324-5) calls ‘similarity-based’ supervenience, according to which there cannot be a large difference in A-
properties unless there is a large difference in B-properties (also see Constantinescu 2014 (182)). 
Hypersensitivity yields a failure of similarity-based supervenience, but not vice versa.   
39 Parfit 1984 (388). 
40 For relevant discussion, see: Arntzenius and Hawthorne 2005; Russell 2008; and Chen 2020.  
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 Response to the second objection: It is indeed plausible that we should reject (1). But 
while (1), (2), and the rejection of Tradeoffs are together sufficient for hypersensitivity, (1) is 
not necessary. We can instead appeal to (3): for any well-being level Li, and slightly lower 
level Li+1, and any number of people n, if the only difference between two populations is that 
one contains n people at level Li and the other contains n-1 people at level Li & one person at 
level Li+1, then the difference between them is slight. Claim (3) avoids the controversial 
implication that many individually slight differences collectively constitute a slight 
difference. Instead, (3) very modestly says that one individual slight difference between two 
populations constitutes a slight difference between them. 
The conjunction of (2), (3), Transitivity, and the rejection of Tradeoffs, entails that 
there is hypersensitivity. To see this, consider the following sub-spectrum argument for 
Tradeoffs. At each succeeding step of this argument, there is only ever one fewer person who 
is at the slightly higher well-being level: 
 
For any well-being level Li, and slightly lower level Li+1, and any number of people n, 
there is some number m such that 
   n-1 people at Li & one person at Li+1 & another m people at Li+1 
is better than  
n people all at Li. 
 
And, for any m, there is some m+ such that 
  n-2 people at Li & two people at Li+1 & another m+ people at Li+1 
is better than 
  n-1 people at Li & one person at Li+1 & another m people at Li+1. 
 
30 
 
…and so on…  
 
 And, for any m+…+, there is some m+…++ such that 
n-n people (0 people) at Li & n people at Li+1 & another m+…++ people at Li+1 
   is better than 
n-(n-1) people (1 person) at Li & n-1 people at Li+1 & another m+…+ people at 
Li+1.    
 
The claims of this sub-spectrum argument together with Transitivity entail that, for any well-
being level Li, and slightly lower level Li+1, and any number of people n, there is some 
number m such that m people all at Li+1 is better than n people all at Li. But this just is 
Tradeoffs. So, Transitivity together with the rejection of Tradeoffs entails the rejection of at 
least one of the claims of this sub-spectrum argument.  
But, given (2) and (3), the rejection of any of the claims of this sub-spectrum 
argument entails that there is hypersensitivity. If we reject any of the claims of the sub-
spectrum argument, we claim that there is some well-being level Li some number of people n, 
and some number of people m, such that there is no number of people at slightly lower level 
Li+1, together with n-1 people at level Li, that is better than n people at level Li & m people at 
level Li+1. From (2), if m+ is radically larger than m, then n people at level Li & m+ people at 
level Li+1 [population X*] is radically better than n people at level Li & m people at level Li+1 
[population Z*]. From the rejection of any of the claims of the sub-spectrum argument, n-1 
people at level Li & one person at Li+1 & m+ people at level Li+1 [population Y*] is not better 
than n people at level Li & m people at level Li+1 [population Z*]. From (3), the difference 
between n people at level Li & m+ people at level Li+1 [population X*] and n-1 people at level 
Li & one person at Li+1 & m+ people at level Li+1 [population Y*] is slight. Thus, we have a 
31 
 
slight difference in B-properties (well-being levels) between population X* and population 
Y* that makes it the case that, while population X* is radically A-er (better) than population 
Z*, population Y* is not A-er (better) than population Z*. This is hypersensitivity.41  
The third objection is that the vagueness of terms like ‘slight’ and ‘radical’ make it 
impossible to tell whether and when hypersensitivity occurs. Relatedly, what will seem a 
slight or radical difference in one context may not seem so in another. The difference 
between stubbing one’s toe and not, for instance, might seem a slight difference in the 
context of one’s whole life, but a radical one in the context of a single moment.  
Response to the third objection: There is a definition of hypersensitivity which avoids 
the non-comparative notions of ‘slight’ and ‘radical’ differences, and which holds that 
hypersensitivity is a matter of degree. Here it is. 
 
Take two types of difference in B-properties, a ‘B1-difference’ and a ‘B2-difference’. 
There is some degree of hypersensitivity of A-properties to B-properties when, while 
a B1-difference is no greater than a B2-difference, just one token B1-difference makes 
an A-difference that is at least as large as the A-difference that any number of token 
B2-differences could collectively make. This degree of hypersensitivity is greater, the 
smaller a B1-difference is relative to a B2-difference, and the larger the A-difference 
that any number of token B2-differences could collectively make. 
 
Consider the sub-spectrum argument. Let a B1-difference be the difference between someone 
being at positive well-being level Li and someone being at adjacent lower positive level Li+1. 
                                                          
41 I believe, but will not show here, that this argument can be reformulated so that the relevant differences in B-
properties are strictly natural (non-evaluative) differences, such as slight differences in pleasure intensity and/or 
duration. 
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Let a B2-difference be the difference of there being an additional person at positive level Li+1. 
In the sub-spectrum argument, population X* differs from population Z* by some number of 
token B2-differences—that is, X* contains some number of additional people at level Li+1. 
The larger this number, the larger the degree to which population X* is better than population 
Z*. But, no matter how much larger this number is, population Y* is not better than 
population Z*, even though population Y* differs from population X* by one token B1-
difference. That is, the difference in betterness that one token B1-difference makes is at least 
as large as the difference in betterness (the A-difference) that any number of token B2-
differences could collectively make. We have some degree of hypersensitivity here, if a B1-
difference is no greater than a B2-difference. Token B2-differences are smaller, the lower the 
level Li+1 is. So, to ensure that a B1-difference is never any greater than a B2-difference, we 
can set up Finite Spectrum with a precisification of ‘slight’ so that the difference between 
someone being at level Li and someone being at slightly lower level Li+1 is no greater than the 
difference of there being an additional person at even the very lowest positive level in the 
series, level Lk.42 Indeed, we can set up Finite Spectrum with a precisification of ‘slight’ so 
that our B1-difference is as tiny a fraction of our B2-difference as we like. Depending on the 
precisification of ‘slight’ we use in setting up Finite Spectrum, the rejection of any of the 
claims of the sub-spectrum argument will yield hypersensitivity to various degrees. So, given 
                                                          
42 One might object that, since B1-differences involve only quality of life whereas B2-differences involve 
number of people as well, we cannot meaningfully compare the size of one difference with that of another. 
While there are difficult questions concerning the comparison of difference-size when a difference is larger 
along one dimension and smaller along another, B1-differences are smaller than B2-differences both in quality of 
life and in number of people (B1-differences involve no difference in number of people). 
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Transitivity, the rejection of Tradeoffs will likewise yield various degrees of hypersensitivity. 
But any degree of hypersensitivity seems deeply puzzling.43 
 
V. Conclusion 
Ethics in the tradition of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons is riddled with spectrum 
arguments. These arguments, such as the spectrum argument for the Repugnant Conclusion 
that I focused on here, have important theoretical and practical implications. According to the 
sorites analogy, since spectrum arguments are relevantly structurally analogous to sorites 
arguments, the correct response to spectrum arguments is structurally analogous to the correct 
response to sorites arguments.  
I first considered some potential structural disanalogies between spectrum arguments 
and sorites arguments, including one according to which, while sorites arguments appeal to a 
tolerance premise, spectrum arguments do not. I showed how a transitivityless spectrum 
argument is structurally analogous to a multidimensional sorites argument—among other 
things, both appeal to a tolerance premise. This structural analogy invites defenders of the 
sorites analogy to argue that, if the correct response to the multidimensional argument is to 
reject Tolerance*, then the correct response to the transitivityless spectrum argument is to 
reject Tolerance. And, if we ought to reject Tolerance, then we also ought to reject the 
conjunction of Tradeoffs and Transitivity (of the original spectrum argument).  
                                                          
43 It is plausible that the difference in betterness (the A-difference) that any number of token B2-differences 
could collectively make is greater, the higher level Li+1 is. For example, consider a pair of populations in which 
everyone in each is at a very low positive level, and consider another pair of populations in which everyone in 
each is at a very high positive level. The difference in betterness that any difference in population size between 
the second pair of populations could make seems greater than the difference in betterness that any difference in 
population size between the first pair of populations could make. There may accordingly be more or less 
hypersensitivity depending on where along the spectrum the rejection of Tradeoffs occurs. 
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I then turned to two content-based disanalogies between spectrum arguments and 
sorites arguments. According to these disanalogies, even if these arguments are relevantly 
structurally analogous, they differ in their content in ways that show the sorites analogy to be 
implausible. I argued that, while we can offer a relatively sanguine response to the 
multidimensional sorites argument featuring the relation of being heapier than, we cannot 
offer such a response to the transitivityless spectrum argument. And I argued that, while 
rejecting Tradeoffs of the original spectrum argument yields hypersensitivity, rejecting 
Tradeoffs* of a relevantly structurally analogous sorites argument does not. Despite their 
structural similarities, it can be deeply distorting to think of a spectrum argument as ‘just 
another sorites’.  
There is a broader methodological lesson here. The logic underlying the sorites 
analogy is flawed. That is, it is dubious that if two arguments are relevantly structurally 
analogous, the correct response to one is structurally analogous to the correct response to the 
other. We should expect to see content-based disanalogies not just between spectrum 
arguments and sorites arguments, but also within the class of sorites arguments, and within 
the class of spectrum arguments.44 While I have focused here on spectrum arguments 
involving tradeoffs between quality of life and number of people, others involve tradeoffs 
between different evaluatively relevant dimensions, for example, intensity and duration of 
pain, severity and number of harms, pleasure and rational activity, and so on. We should not 
ignore structural similarities between these arguments, but equally we should not ignore 
dissimilarities in their content. 
                                                          
44 In section III I highlighted a content-based disanalogy within the class of sorites arguments, and in section IV 
I suggested a potential content-based disanalogy between the spectrum argument for the Repugnant Conclusion 
and the spectrum argument for the Negative Repugnant Conclusion. 
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The most puzzling spectrum arguments do not admit of sanguine solutions. They 
leave us with the humbler task of identifying which solutions are the least implausible. 
Solutions that avoid the repugnant conclusions of these spectrum arguments are far more 
implausible than most of us would like to believe. 
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